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INTRODUCTION 
Restitution is an independent basis of civil liability, parallel 
to contract and tort.  Despite its importance, however, the law of 
restitution may not be as familiar to lawyers as the law of contract 
or the law of tort.1  The purpose of this article is to provide a brief 
primer on restitution, with respect to the substantive law of 
unjust enrichment, various restitutionary remedies, and possible 
defenses to a claim in restitution. 
In presenting this overview, I draw from the essential 
resource on the subject—the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, published by the American Law Institute 
in 20112—as well as pertinent Rhode Island cases.  To facilitate 
reader understanding of the subject, the text of this article focuses 
on legal concepts rather than case descriptions. Supporting Rhode 
Island cases are cited extensively in the footnotes.  Part I of the 
article discusses general principles pertaining to the law of 
restitution; Part II addresses liability in restitution (the cause of 
action in unjust enrichment); Part III describes restitutionary 
remedies; and Part IV discusses defenses that are unique to the 
cause of action in unjust enrichment. 
I.   GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
To provide background for the ensuing discussion of 
restitutionary causes of action and remedies, this part of the 
article discusses general principles that pertain to the law of 
 
 1.  Professor Andrew Kull, the Reporter of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011), in 2000 lamented that “a 
substantial portion of the American bench and bar today could not 
comfortably explain what the ‘law of restitution is’ or how it works.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT reporter’s 
intro. memo., at xvi (Discussion Draft 2000).  He attributed the lack of 
familiarity about restitution in part to the disappearance of a course on 
restitution from the U.S. law school curriculum in the mid-1960s.  Id. 
 2.  The American Law Institute has explained the function of 
Restatements: “Restatements are addressed to courts and others applying 
existing law.  Restatements aim at clear formulations of common law and its 
statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or 
might plausibly be stated by a court.”  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING 
THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS 
AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2015), available at 
http://www.ali.org/doc/StyleManual.pdf. 
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restitution.  Besides defining the concepts of “restitution” and 
“unjust enrichment,” this part also offers distinctive advantages of 
the unjust enrichment cause of action and of restitutionary 
remedies.  Moreover, although restitution and unjust enrichment 
often are termed “equitable” in the loose sense of “fairness,” this 
part makes clear that some forms of restitution are technically 
“legal” while other forms are technically “equitable.”  Finally, this 
part explains that the law of restitution is subordinate to the law 
of contract in two principal respects: 1) the terms of an enforceable 
contract normally displace a claim in unjust enrichment, and 2) 
non-gratuitous transfers of benefits are expected to be made 
pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible. 
A.   Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Defined 
The terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are 
interchangeable to denote a basis of civil liability, distinct from 
contract or tort, that is premised on the basic principle that: “A 
person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is 
subject to liability in restitution.”3  To be “unjustly enriched” is to 
obtain an economic benefit (such as money, property, a service, a 
saved expenditure, or a discharged obligation) when that benefit 
was transferred without an adequate legal basis.4  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court has recognized unjust enrichment as a 
 
 3.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1; see 
also Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of the State of R.I., 61 A.3d 
432, 438 (R.I. 2013) (“‘Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a 
benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.’” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a)). 
 4.  See, e.g., APG, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 436 F.3d 294, 306 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (applying Rhode Island law to conclude that an unjust enrichment 
claim could be asserted by a subdistributor against a seller for time and effort 
expended by the subdistributor to sell products of the seller); Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Drainville, CA 07-427 ML, 2009 WL 1209473, at *4 (D.R.I. May 4, 
2009) (noting that “benefit” is construed broadly under the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment but expressing doubts that refraining from legal action 
constitutes a “benefit”); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 99 
(R.I. 2006) (stating that materials, services, improvements to property, and 
stolen utilities are examples of benefits within the law of unjust enrichment); 
Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 113–14 (R.I. 2005) (home 
improvements constituted a benefit under the law of unjust enrichment); 
Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gautier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148–49 (R.I. 1994) (medical 
services constituted a benefit under the law of unjust enrichment). 
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distinctive cause of action and stated its fundamental elements: 
[U]njust enrichment . . . can stand alone as a cause of 
action in its own right.  To recover for unjust enrichment, 
a claimant must prove: (1) that he or she conferred a 
benefit upon the party from whom relief is sought; (2) 
that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3) that the 
recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances 
“that it would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain 
the benefit without paying the value thereof.”5 
The cause of action in unjust enrichment historically has been 
recognized under different names such as “implied-in-law 
contract” and “quasi-contract.”6  (A claim for “quantum meruit” 
technically can be either a contract claim or an unjust enrichment 
claim, depending on the circumstances.)7  The nomenclature of 
 
 5.  Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d at 113 (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I. 1997)).  
Regarding the second requirement for a cause of action in unjust enrichment, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that “a benefit is 
‘appreciated’ when the defendant has used it in a way that has value to the 
defendant.”  R.I. State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., CA No. 12-198S, 2013 
WL 5509200, at *8 (D.R.I. May 31, 2013) (report and recommendation) (citing 
Carbone, 898 A.2d at 99–100), adopted in part and rejected in part by R.I. 
State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., C.A. No. 12-198S, 2013 WL 5205800 
(D.R.I. Sept. 13, 2013).  
 6.  See, e.g., Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC, 61 A.3d 
414, 418 (R.I. 2013) (“This Court has held that actions brought upon theories 
of unjust enrichment and quasi contract are essentially the same.” (quoting 
Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I. 2002)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Hurdis Realty, Inc. v. N. Providence, 397 A.2d 896, 897 (R.I. 1979)  
(equating “implied in law contract” with “quasi-contract”).   
 7.  A recent decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Process 
Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. DiGregorio, Inc., 93 A.3d 1047, 1052–53 
(R.I. 2014) has some confusing language that attempts to distinguish 
between quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, citing a Connecticut 
appellate court case and Black’s Law Dictionary. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT more clearly explains the potential 
overlap between quantum meruit and the cause of action in unjust 
enrichment: 
If it is appropriate to conclude that a promise to pay reasonable 
compensation (usually measured by market price) was part of the 
parties’ agreement—although nowhere expressed in so many 
words—a recovery called “quantum meruit” enforces an implied term 
of an actual contract.  Such an obligation is part of contract law, not 
restitution . . . . [Q]uantum meruit . . . was equally available to 
recover the value of benefits conferred in cases where the defendant 
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“quasi contract” and “implied-in-law contract” is misleading, 
however.  The cause of action in unjust enrichment does not 
require a contract; no prior consent between the parties, either 
express or implied, is necessary.8  Thus, it is better to use the 
terms “unjust enrichment” or “restitution,” making clear that this 
basis of civil liability is independent of contract law. 
Very importantly, in contrast to contract or tort causes of 
action, the cause of action in unjust enrichment in many contexts 
does not require that the recipient of the benefit have been at 
fault.  For example, a claimant who mistakenly conferred a benefit 
on a recipient may be entitled to restitution of the benefit itself or 
the value of the benefit.9  Even if the recipient was not at fault in 
receiving the benefit or even if the claimant was the one at fault in 
conferring the benefit, the claimant may recover in restitution if 
the recipient was unjustly enriched.  Moreover, a cause of action 
in unjust enrichment may exist even if the claimant has not 
suffered an economic loss; the cause of action depends instead on 
whether the recipient has unjustly received an economic benefit 
from the claimant.10 
B. Distinctive Advantages of the Unjust Enrichment Cause of 
Action and of Restitutionary Remedies 
Restitution, in both its substantive and remedial aspects, has 
several distinctive advantages over other civil causes of action and 
 
had made no promise, express or implied.  A classic example is the 
action to recover the value of medical services to an unconscious 
patient. . . . No lawyer today would describe the patient’s obligation 
as contractual, but restitution in such cases—being pleaded in 
quantum meruit—was long said to be based on a “contract implied in 
law.”   
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. e.   
 8.  See, e.g., Hurdis Realty, 397 A.2d at 897 (equating “implied in law 
contract” with “quasi-contract” and stating that liability under either label “is 
implied by the law and arises from the facts and circumstances irrespective of 
any agreement or presumed intention”). 
 9.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 10.  An example is a fiduciary that uses the beneficiary’s money for the 
fiduciary’s own purposes, makes a profit with that money, and restores the 
beneficiary’s money in full before the legal violation is discovered.  Even 
though the beneficiary did not sustain an economic loss, the fiduciary was 
unjustly enriched by wrongfully taking the money from the beneficiary, and 
the fiduciary will be required to disgorge to the beneficiary the profit gained.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. b. 
CMURPHYFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015  12:39 PM 
2015] REMEDIES UNDER RHODE ISLAND LAW 435 
remedies.  The law of restitution is advantageous in the following 
circumstances: 
 Claimant’s only cause of action is unjust enrichment 
(i.e., the circumstances do not present a tort, contract, 
or statutory cause of action) 
 Recipient’s gain from receiving a benefit at Claimant’s 
expense exceeds Claimant’s loss 
 Recipient’s gain is easier to prove than Claimant’s loss 
 Claimant wants to rescind a transaction (such as a 
contract) and obtain restitution of any benefit that 
Claimant conferred pursuant to the transaction 
 Recipient is insolvent and Claimant is able to identify 
and obtain a specific asset held by Recipient in which 
Claimant is deemed to have an equitable interest 
 Claimant seeks to obtain its asset or the traceable 
product of its asset in the possession of a third person 
Part II, discussing the cause of action in unjust enrichment, and 
Part III, discussing restitutionary remedies, will delve into the 
required elements for any of the foregoing advantages to be 
realized. 
C.   Restitution May be “Legal” or “Equitable” 
The cause of action in unjust enrichment has been loosely 
termed “equitable” in the general sense of achieving fairness.11  
 
 11.  In apparently the first case to articulate the general principle of 
unjust enrichment in English law, Moses v. MacFerlan, Lord Mansfield 
stated—in a common law court (not an equity court)—that:  
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural 
justice to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, 
founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s case . . . In one word, the gist 
of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances 
of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to 
refund the money.   
(1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.) 678, 681.  Although Lord Mansfield employed 
the term “equity” and “equitable” throughout his opinion, he used those terms 
in a nontechnical way to connote fairness.  One of the leading American 
restitution scholars in the early to mid-twentieth century stated: “Restitution 
is the equitable principle by which one who has been enriched at the expense 
of another, whether by mistake, or otherwise, is under a duty to return what 
he has received or its value to the other.  Perhaps unjust enrichment would 
be a better term.”  Warren A. Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L. 
REV. 257, 257 (1954).  Here again, the term “equitable” is used in the 
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However, as a technical and historical matter, some strands of 
restitution are “legal,” while others are “equitable.”12  Some Rhode 
Island decisions (as well as numerous decisions in other courts) 
have erroneously asserted that unjust enrichment or restitution is 
exclusively “equitable” in the technical sense.13  Concrete 
consequences, including whether a right to jury trial exists, 
whether an action is authorized by statute, and whether certain 
types of defenses are available, depend on a proper understanding 
of which restitutionary causes of action and remedies are 
technically “legal” and which are technically “equitable.”  
Typically, a simple money judgment for the value of a benefit 
obtained by the defendant is a “legal” remedy, as is monetary 
restitution of a defendant’s unjust gain of money.14  By contrast, 
the asset-based remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien 
are technically “equitable” remedies.15 
D.   The Primacy of Contract Law 
If the parties have a valid contract between them, any rights 
 
nontechnical meaning of fairness. 
 12.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4. 
 13.  See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU 
L. REV. 1577, 1607–34 (2002) (discussing how federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court of the United States, have confused nontechnical with 
technical uses of the term “equitable” in classifying monetary restitution).  
For examples of Rhode Island opinions that failed to recognize that many 
actions for unjust enrichment are technically and historically “legal” rather 
than “equitable,” see United Lending Corp. v. Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 632 
(R.I. 2003) (“It is true that claims for unjust enrichment sound in equity and 
that in general, equitable actions do not fall within the purview of [R.I.G.L.] 
45-15-5.” (citations omitted)); Rosetta v. Moretti, No. 98-89, 2005 WL 
1109638, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 4, 2005) (“Unjust enrichment sounds in 
equity and as such, it is a matter to be decided ultimately by the Court.  It is 
a matter for the Court, not the jury, to decide.”). 
 14.  See Murphy, supra note 13, at 1598–1607 (discussing legal and 
equitable roots of restitution and documenting that monetary recovery of 
defendant’s gain of money generally is a remedy at law with some important 
exceptions—recovery of money is a remedy in equity when the money was 
obtained by abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, when the 
defendant is insolvent and the plaintiff thus needs a constructive trust or 
equitable lien, or when the plaintiff seeks to trace its property through 
subsequent changes in form or into the hands of a third person). 
 15.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 
cmt. d (stating that “the hallmark of equitable remedies in restitution cases is 
that they give relief to the claimant via rights in identifiable assets” and 
citing the constructive trust and equitable lien as examples).  
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and remedies are governed by the law of contract, not the law of 
unjust enrichment.16  A cause of action in unjust enrichment may 
not displace rights and obligations specified by a valid contract.17  
Moreover, the law of unjust enrichment should not undermine 
legal incentives to enter contracts.  Thus, it is often said that one 
who voluntarily conferred a benefit has no cause of action in 
unjust enrichment.  This general proposition is subject to some 
exceptions, such as when the benefit was conferred in an 
emergency situation.18  As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment explains, “[t]here is no liability in 
restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, 
unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant’s 
intervention in the absence of contract.”19 
II. LIABILITY IN RESTITUTION: THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
As the law governing liability for the transfer of a benefit 
without an adequate legal basis, the law of unjust enrichment 
applies in many different contexts.  The general categories of 
liability in unjust enrichment are: when a benefit was acquired by 
a transfer subject to avoidance (such as benefit transferred by 
mistake or by defective consent); when the recipient of the benefit 
did not request the benefit but it would be unjust for the recipient 
to retain the benefit without paying for it (such as when the 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002). 
 17.  See, e.g., Café La France, Inc. v. Schneider Sec., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 
361, 375 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating that under Rhode Island law, “[u]njust 
enrichment is an equitable doctrine that, in the absence of an enforceable 
contract, allows a plaintiff to recover a benefit transferred to a defendant if 
that defendant’s ongoing possession would be inequitable” but concluding 
that an enforceable contract existed between the parties, thus precluding the 
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim (citing Doe, 808 A.2d at 1095)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (“A valid 
contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, 
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”).   
 18.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 19.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(3); 
see also E. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1272–73 (R.I. 1989) 
(“When a party makes improvements or confers a benefit upon the land of 
another with full knowledge that title is vested in another, or subject to 
dispute, the improver will not be entitled to restitution under the . . . doctrine 
of unjust enrichment.”).   
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restitution claimant conferred the benefit in an emergency); when 
the recipient requested the benefit but the restitution claimant 
does not have a valid contract claim against the recipient; and 
when the benefit was wrongfully acquired (such as by tort or 
breach of a fiduciary or confidential duty).  In the next few 
sections, I will discuss these categories in turn. 
A.   Benefit Was Acquired Through a Transfer Subject to 
Avoidance 
Liability in restitution may exist when the restitution 
claimant has transferred a benefit to the recipient, but the 
transfer was, in the words of the Restatement (Third), 
“imperfectly voluntary” and thus subject to rescission or 
avoidance.20  Common contexts in which the transfer of a benefit 
is subject to avoidance are when the restitution claimant 
transferred a benefit by mistake or when the transfer of a benefit 
was the product of defective consent or authority.21 
1.   Mistake 
One who receives a benefit by mistake may be liable in 
restitution, notwithstanding that the recipient may have been 
innocent in receiving the benefit.22  Courts applying Rhode Island 
law have recognized a cause of action in unjust enrichment for 
mistaken payment of money,23 mistaken good faith improvement 
of another’s property,24 and mistaken performance of another’s 
 
 20.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 2, 
intro. note.   
 21.  See id.  The Restatement also discusses “payment of a judgment 
subsequently reversed or avoided, or payment of a tax not legally due” as 
transfers subject to avoidance, giving rise to potential unjust enrichment.  
Id.; see also id. at §§ 18–19. 
 22.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 5–12. 
 23.  See, e.g., RBS Citizens v. Avaya, Inc., CA No. 14-cv-02-M, 2013 WL 
2158933, at *12 (D.R.I. May 23, 2014) (describing allegations of overpayment 
as pleading a plausible unjust enrichment claim); Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 
A.2d 1286, 1288–89 (R.I. 1999) (allowing recovery of mistaken overpayment). 
 24. See, e.g., Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 114 (R.I. 2005) 
(finding former daughter-in-law entitled to restitution of the appreciated 
value attributable to improvements she made to a house owned by her in-
laws when she reasonably believed her in-laws intended the house to be a 
wedding gift to her and her husband.).  A property owner that improves its 
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obligation.25  One who mistakenly conferred a benefit on another 
has a claim in unjust enrichment against the recipient of the 
benefit, subject to the recipient’s possible defense that it 
innocently and justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistake.26 
2.   Defective Consent or Authority27 
Examples of a benefit conferred by defective consent or 
authority include a benefit obtained by fraud or material 
misrepresentation,28 duress,29 or undue influence.30  Yet another 
 
property, with the incidental effect that a neighbor’s property increases in 
value, does not have a cause of action in unjust enrichment against the 
neighbor.  See, e.g., R.I. State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., C.A. No. 12-
198S, 2013 WL 5205800, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 13, 2013) (stating that, although 
RISPP’s work on its own property increased the value of Cargill’s property, 
RISPP’s unjust enrichment claim against Cargill failed); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. b, illus. 
2 (“Improvements to A’s property increase the market value of B’s adjoining 
land. B sells and realizes substantial additional proceeds as the result of A’s 
expenditure.  B is not liable to A in restitution.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Alessi v. Bowen Court Condo., No. 03-0235, 2010 WL 
897246 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010) (finding that plaintiff, who paid 
property taxes on the mistaken belief that he owned the property, was 
entitled to restitution from defendant who actually owned the property.). 
 26.  See infra Part IV. 
 27.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT  §§ 13–19. 
 28.  See, e.g., J. K. Social Club v. J. K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 
(R.I. 1982) (acknowledging that fraud can lead to the creation of a 
constructive trust); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 13 (discussing liability in restitution when the transfer of a 
benefit was induced by fraud or material misrepresentation). 
 29.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 
(discussing liability in restitution when the transfer of a benefit was induced 
by duress and defining duress as “coercion that is wrongful as a matter of 
law”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, No. CA 03-219-S, 2004 WL 5308782, at 
*9 (D.R.I. Nov. 30, 2004) (report and recommendation) (concluding that 
Rhode Island law allows an action for undue influence and stating “that 
undue influence is not a tort, but rather a set of circumstances which gives 
rise to an equitable remedy, such as rescission, restitution, or, . . . imposition 
of a constructive trust” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation 
adopted by Umsted v. Umsted, No. 03-CV-219-S, 2005 WL 5438379 (D.R.I. 
Feb. 18, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 15 (discussing liability in restitution for a transfer of a benefit 
that was induced by undue influence and defining undue influence as 
“excessive and unfair persuasion, sufficient to overcome the free will of the 
transferor, between parties who occupy either a confidential relation or a 
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example is a benefit obtained from someone who lacked the legal 
capacity to transfer the benefit.31  When the claimant’s consent to 
the transfer of the benefit was impaired for one of these reasons, 
the claimant has a claim in unjust enrichment against the 
recipient of the benefit. 
B.   Benefit Was Not Requested, but Recipient Would be Unjustly 
Enriched If Recipient Did Not Pay for the Benefit 
In some circumstances, the recipient of the benefit did not 
request the benefit but it would nonetheless be unjust for the 
recipient to retain the benefit.  The Restatement (Third) addresses 
three broad contexts in which a claimant could be considered to 
have justifiably conferred an unrequested benefit on the recipient, 
with the claimant possibly entitled restitution: “emergency 
intervention,”32  “performance rendered to a third person,”33 and 
“self-interested intervention.”34 
1.   Emergency Intervention 
A person who confers a benefit in an emergency to protect 
another’s life or health,35 or to protect another’s property,36 or to 
 
relation of dominance on one side and subservience on the other”). 
 31.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
16, 33 (discussing liability in restitution when the benefit at issue was 
transferred from “a person lacking requisite legal capacity” to make the 
transfer; examples include minors, those who have a mental incapacity, and 
certain legal entities that acted outside the scope of their statutory 
authority).  
 32.  Id. §§ 20–22. 
 33.  Id. §§ 23–25. 
 34.  Id. §§ 26–30. 
 35.  See id. § 20 (“(1) A person who performs, supplies, or obtains 
professional services required for the protection of another’s life or health is 
entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision to intervene without 
request.  (2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by a 
reasonable charge for the services in question.”). 
 36.  See id. § 21 (“(1) A person who takes effective action to protect 
another’s property from threatened harm is entitled to restitution from the 
other as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify 
the decision to intervene without request.  Unrequested intervention is 
justified only when it is reasonable to assume the owner would wish the 
action performed.  (2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by 
the loss avoided or by a reasonable charge for the services provided, 
whichever is less.”).  In Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414, 417–18 (R.I. 1969), the 
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perform another’s duty37 has a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment against the recipient of the benefit. 
2.   Performance Rendered to a Third Person 
 If a claimant performed an obligation of its own, and that 
performance also had the effect of discharging an obligation of 
another person, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the 
other person as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.38  Rights 
to indemnification, contribution, and equitable subrogation fall in 
this category.39 
3.   Self-interested Intervention 
A claim in unjust enrichment may be available to one who has 
made self-interested expenditures to protect, maintain, improve, 
or add value to an asset in which another person also has an 
interest.  For example, if the claimant makes necessary 
expenditures to protect an interest in its property and thus 
confers an economic benefit on another person in consequence of 
the other’s interest in the same property, the claimant has a cause 
of action in unjust enrichment.40  Another example is that of a 
 
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a plaintiff who accepted a racehorse 
for boarding at his farm, when both the buyer and seller of the horse 
disclaimed ownership of the horse, was a mere “volunteer” and thus did not 
have a right to restitution from the defendant buyer.  This result is 
inconsistent with the majority view expressed in the Restatement (Third) 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.  Section 21 of the Restatement bases 
Illustration 11 on this case and asserts that a plaintiff in such a circumstance 
would indeed be “entitled to an equitable lien on the horse, securing to that 
extent a claim in restitution for the value of its services in preserving the 
property; but [plaintiff] has no claim under this section against either [b]uyer 
or [s]eller apart from its rights as lienor.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. d, illus. 11. 
 37.  See, e.g., Hurdis Realty, Inc. v. N. Providence, 397 A.2d 896, 897 (R.I. 
1979) (finding that municipality was liable for unjust enrichment for cost of 
repairs that property owner expended to repair town sewer line when 
municipality had the duty to maintain the sewer system, the problem 
required “immediate attention,” and the property owner had unsuccessfully 
attempted to get the municipality to repair the sewer line); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22. 
 38.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
23–25. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, 39 A. 243, 243 (R.I. 1898) (finding 
that life tenant, having paid city’s assessments for installing curb and sewer 
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claimant who makes expenditures to an asset that the claimant 
reasonably expects to acquire or retain, the claimant’s expectation 
is frustrated, and another person becomes the unintended 
beneficiary of the expenditures.41  Yet another example, 
recognized in a decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, is 
that of a person who confers an economic benefit on his intimate 
cohabitant and the benefit in turn makes it possible for the 
intimate cohabitant to acquire property.42 
C.   Benefit Was Requested by Recipient but Claimant Does Not 
Have a Valid Contract Claim 
An unjust enrichment claim is available to a claimant who 
transferred a benefit pursuant to a contract, but, for one of several 
possible reasons, the claimant has no valid claim on the 
contract.43  The claimant would lack a viable contract claim if: (1) 
the contract, when made, was unenforceable44 (e.g., the contract 
 
in order to prevent the sale of the property by the city treasurer, was entitled 
to restitution from the defendant who would obtain the property upon the 
death of the life tenant); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26. 
 41.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
27. 
 42.  See, e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002) 
(recognizing a potential cause of action in unjust enrichment between two 
men who cohabited in an intimate relationship when services rendered by 
one of the men might have aided in the acquisition of property by the other 
man; court did not require proof of a confidential or fiduciary relationship or 
a breach of that relationship); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28(1) (stating that, unless contrary to state law, “[i]f 
two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling 
marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has 
made substantial, uncompensated contributions [either] in the form of 
property or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in 
restitution . . . to prevent unjust enrichment”). 
 43.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
31–36.  As courts applying Rhode Island law have summarized, a party to a 
contract may recover for unjust enrichment if the contract was “‘breached, 
rescinded, or otherwise made invalid, or [if] the benefit received was outside 
the scope of the contract.’”  High Rock Westminster St. LLC v. Bank of 
America, C.A. No. 13-500, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2014) 
(quoting Tantara Corp. v. Bay St. Neighborhood Ass’n, LLC, C.A. No. NC-11-
55, 2012 WL 4848704, at *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012)). 
 44.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
31.   
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was not in writing as required by statute45 or the contract terms 
are indefinite46); (2) the contract is illegal or otherwise 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy;47 (3) the recipient of 
the performance lacked the capacity to contract;48 (4) an initially 
valid contract is avoided subsequent to the claimant’s performance 
because of mistake or supervening change of circumstances;49 (5) 
the recipient demanded, and the claimant supplied, a performance 
that was not due under the contract;50 or (6) the claimant who 
conferred a benefit under the contract also materially breached 
the contract.51  In the foregoing circumstances, the claimant 
generally would be entitled to return of the benefit conferred or 
the value of the benefit.  Moreover, an unjust enrichment claim is 
available to one who erroneously believed that a contract had been 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Brochu v. Santis, 939 A.2d 449, 452–53 (R.I. 2008) (holding 
broker did not have a cause of action in unjust enrichment for real estate 
brokerage commission when agreement between parties was not in writing as 
required by Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-4(6)).  Depending on court 
interpretation of statutes that require a writing and of public policy, 
performance rendered under an oral agreement may or may not trigger a 
right to restitution.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 31, cmts. b, f.  
 46.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 
cmts. b, d. 
 47.  See id. § 32.  The Restatement states that the distinction between 
“unenforceable” and “illegal” agreements “may usually be drawn by inquiring 
whether the contract at issue is one for which the law merely establishes 
special evidentiary requirements, or whether the underlying transaction is 
one that the law actually condemns.”  Id. at § 31 cmt. b. 
 48.  See, e.g., Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148–49 
(R.I. 1994) (explaining that, even if the individual did not have capacity to 
contract, the individual would still be liable under the law of unjust 
enrichment for reasonable charges for medical services rendered); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33. 
 49.  See, e.g., Parker v. Macomber, 24 A. 464, 465 (R.I. 1892) (holding 
that plaintiff who rendered homecare services with his wife to defendant 
pursuant to contract was entitled to restitution for the value of the services 
rendered even though full performance of contract had become impossible 
when his wife died); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 34. 
 50.  See, e.g., High Rock Westminster St. LLC v. Bank of America, C.A. 
No. 13-500, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2014) (noting that a cause 
of action in unjust enrichment may be appropriate when the benefit received 
was outside the scope of the contract); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 35.   
 51.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
36. 
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formed and, because of that erroneous belief, conferred a benefit 
on the recipient.52 
A claimant may assert both a claim for breach of an 
enforceable contract and a claim in unjust enrichment, but those 
claims must be pleaded in the alternative.53  To recover in unjust 
enrichment for a benefit conferred under a contract, the claimant 
must allege that the contract was void, invalid, or otherwise 
flawed.54  If the court finds that the claimant does not have a valid 
contract claim, the claimant may continue with its unjust 
enrichment claim.  If, however, a valid contract claim exists, the 
appropriate cause of action is breach of contract, not unjust 
enrichment.55 
 
 52.  See, e.g., Branch v. Cardillo, C.A. No. PC-07-620, 2011 WL 757389, 
at *6–*7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2011) (finding parties did not reach meeting 
of the minds to form a contract, nor was there promissory estoppel, but 
defendant’s sisters mistakenly believed that an agreement with the 
defendant existed; court therefore concluded that defendant had been 
unjustly enriched by sisters’ payments of expenses associated with 
defendant’s property).  In Branch, it is noteworthy that the plaintiffs did not 
plead unjust enrichment; the court on its own recognized this basis of 
liability.  Id. at *8 n.5.  
 53.  See, e.g., RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Avaya, Inc., C.A. No. 14-cv-02-M, 
2014 WL 2158933, at *4 (D.R.I. May 23, 2014) (noting that the plaintiff was 
allowed to assert both a breach of contract claim and an unjust enrichment 
claim in the alternative); Hasbro, Inc. v. Mikohn Gaming Corp., No. Civ.A. 
05-106-S, 2006 WL 2035501, at *8–9 (D.R.I. July 18, 2006) (stating that 
Rhode Island law allows a party to plead alternative claims for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment (citing Richmond Square Capital Corp. v. 
Ins. House, 744 A.2d 401, 402 (R.I. 1999)). 
 54.  See, e.g., High Rock, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2, *3 n.4. 
 55.  See, e.g., id. at *2 (“[W]hen the benefit received was conferred under 
the terms of a contract and there is no allegation that the contract was 
invalid, voidable, unclear, or otherwise flawed, a court may properly dismiss 
the unjust enrichment claim.”); see also Café La France, Inc. v. Schneider 
Sec., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 361, 375 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating that under Rhode 
Island law, “[u]njust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that, in the absence 
of an enforceable contract, allows a plaintiff to recover a benefit transferred 
to a defendant if that defendant’s ongoing possession would be inequitable” 
but concluding that an enforceable contract existed between the parties, thus 
obviating the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim (citing Doe v. Burkland, 808 
A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (“A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as 
to matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust 
enrichment.”).   
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D.   Benefit Was Wrongfully Acquired 
If a legal wrong to the claimant resulted in an economic 
benefit to the recipient, the claimant is entitled to restitution of 
the gain.56  One type of legal wrong that may give rise to a claim 
in unjust enrichment is the intentional and wrongful interference 
with an intended donative transfer of a benefit.57  The intended 
donee of the benefit has an unjust enrichment claim against the 
recipient of the benefit, whether the misconduct was the act of the 
recipient or of a third person.58  Other legal wrongs that may 
result in an economic gain to the recipient are torts and violations 
of a fiduciary or confidential relation; I will elaborate on these 
bases for an unjust enrichment claim below. 
1.   Tort 
When the recipient has acquired a benefit because of a tort 
committed against the claimant (such as fraud, misappropriation 
of funds, or conversion of property), the claimant may pursue 
either a tort claim or an unjust enrichment claim against the 
person who committed the tort.59  Significantly, an unjust 
 
 56.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 
(“A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”). 
 57.  The Restatement (Third) states that  
[i]f assets that would otherwise have passed by donative transfer to 
the claimant are diverted to another recipient by fraud, duress, 
undue influence, or other intentional misconduct, the recipient is 
liable to the claimant for unjust enrichment.  The misconduct that 
invalidates the transfer to the recipient may be the act of the 
recipient or of a third person. 
Id. § 46(1) (“Wrongful Interference with Donative Transfer”).  See also id. at § 
45 (“Homicide: the Slayer Rule”). 
 58.  See id. at § 46(1).  
 59.  See, e.g., Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 998 F.2d 
1092, 1100 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that under Rhode Island law, “the 
existence of fraud or other wrongdoing is a factor in determining whether the 
retention of a benefit would be inequitable”).  See generally RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 40–42.  But see Hauser v. 
Davis, No. C.A. KC 93-0295, 2000 WL 1910031, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 
2000) (holding that because defendant took benefit from plaintiff, it was not 
conferred upon him and thus recovery was in tort, which was barred by the 
statute of limitations, not unjust enrichment).  Hauser is inconsistent with 
the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and the Restatement, which 
indicate that a cause of action in unjust enrichment may encompass benefits 
tortiously obtained.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
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enrichment claim can be successful against a person who did not 
commit the tort or even know of the tort, provided the person was 
unjustly enriched by a benefit that resulted from the tort.60 
The cause of action in unjust enrichment may provide a more 
favorable remedy than the cause of action in tort.  Specifically, if 
the defendant’s gain from the benefit exceeded the claimant’s loss 
and the defendant was a conscious tortfeasor, the claimant may 
seek disgorgement of the defendant’s gain in unjust enrichment 
rather than compensatory damages for the claimant’s loss in 
tort.61  A classic and widely cited case in another jurisdiction is 
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., in which the plaintiff was able to 
obtain, on a unjust enrichment cause of action, the disgorgement 
of the defendant’s profits (the defendant’s savings of labor costs) 
from the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s abandoned egg-washing 
machine.62  If the plaintiff had instead pursued a tort claim, the 
measure of recovery would have been the plaintiff’s loss—rental 
value of the machine—the amount of which was substantially less 
than the defendant’s labor savings.63 
2.   Breach of a Fiduciary Duty or Breach of an Equivalent Duty 
Imposed by a Relation of Trust or Confidence 
One who violated a fiduciary or confidential duty to the 
claimant is liable for the claimant’s losses or, under an alternative 
claim for unjust enrichment, for any net profit that the recipient 
gained from violating the duty.64  To determine whether a 
 
ENRICHMENT § 40. 
 60.  See, e.g., Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 93, 99–100 
(R.I. 2006) (finding that the wife of a tortfeasor, who illegally diverted 
electricity to their home, was jointly and severally liable for unjust 
enrichment even though she did not know of the electricity bypass). 
 61.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 
5, topic 1, intro. note.  
 62.  173 P.2d 652, 653, 655 (Wash. 1947). 
 63.  Id. at 654. 
 64.  See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 42–50 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(predicting, in a case for breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders of 
closely held corporation, that Rhode Island law would allow plaintiffs either 
to obtain a remedy measured by the plaintiffs’ loss—the difference in price 
between what they received for their stock and its fair value at the time of 
sale—or a remedy based on the defendants’ wrongful profits in order to avoid 
unjust enrichment); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 43.   
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fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between parties, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated: 
The court may consider a variety of factors, including the 
reliance of one party upon the other, the relationship of 
the parties prior to the incidents complained of, the 
relative business capacities or lack thereof between the 
parties, and the readiness of one party to follow the 
other’s guidance in complicated transactions.  There is no 
requirement in this jurisdiction that a defendant must 
occupy a position of dominance over a plaintiff.65 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has at times found a 
fiduciary or confidential relationship to have existed between 
family members,66 although it has also stated that “[c]onfidential 
or fiduciary relationships do not inherently exist between family 
members.”67  Courts applying Rhode Island law to unjust 
enrichment claims have also found fiduciary or confidential 
relationships to have existed between a company and a director 
and officer of the company,68 between minority shareholders of a 
closely held family corporation and directors and officers of the 
corporation,69 and between persons in intimate, but unmarried, 
 
 65.  Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 129 (R.I. 1985) (citation omitted). 
 66.  See, e.g., id. (finding a confidential relationship between a brother 
and sister when siblings had complete trust and confidence in one another 
and their relationship was a motivating factor in influencing the brother to 
name his sister as primary beneficiary); Cahill v. Antonelli, 390 A.2d 936, 939 
(R.I. 1978) (finding a fiduciary relationship between a brother and sister 
because the brother had acted as an agent of his sister); Del Greco v. Del 
Greco, 142 A.2d 714, 717 (R.I. 1958) (finding a fiduciary relationship between 
a mother and son because the mother had trusted her son to care for her 
during the remainder of her life). 
 67.  Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111–12 (R.I. 2005) (finding 
former daughter-in-law not entitled to a constructive trust over a house 
owned by her in-laws and in which she resided because facts did not establish 
a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the plaintiff and her former 
in-laws).   
 68.  See, e.g., Sladen v. Rowse, 347 A.2d 409, 412–13 (R.I. 1975) 
(imposing constructive trust on stock in favor of company because defendant, 
who was a director and officer of the company, breached his fiduciary 
obligations by diverting the opportunity to buy the stock at a low price to 
himself). 
 69.  See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 (D.R.I. 2004) 
(finding that defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the minority 
shareholders by failing to disclose that the corporation soon might be sold). 
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relationships.70 
III.   RESTITUTIONARY REMEDIES 
A number of remedies are restitutionary.  Examples include a 
money judgment based on the defendant’s gain rather than the 
claimant’s loss, the return of benefits that were transferred before 
a contract was rescinded, the constructive trust, and the equitable 
lien.  The simplest remedy for a court to impose is the return to 
the plaintiff of the exact benefit that the defendant received, 
whether the benefit was money or a different type of asset.  Many 
restitutionary remedies are not so simple, however.  A benefit may 
be nonreturnable, such as when the benefit was in the form of 
services.  A restitution claimant may be entitled to more than the 
exact benefit that the recipient obtained.  An asset transferred 
from the claimant to the recipient may have changed into a 
different form or been transferred into the hands of a third person.  
In the following sections, I will discuss these complexities, 
focusing on restitution through a money judgment and restitution 
through the asset-based remedies of constructive trust and 
equitable lien. 
A.   Restitution Through a Money Judgment71 
If a defendant has been unjustly enriched by money obtained 
from the claimant, the measure of monetary restitution is 
generally the amount that was transferred from the claimant to 
the defendant.72  An important exception to this rule is posed by 
the defaulting fiduciary or the “conscious wrongdoer” who acted 
with knowledge of the underlying wrong to the claimant or despite 
 
 70.  See, e.g., Randeau v. Laplante, C.A. No. WC-2011-0116, 2013 WL 
5502262, at *14–16, *19 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (finding a fiduciary 
relationship existed between an unmarried couple, but concluding that there 
had not been a breach of a promise or an act involving fraud, and thus, a 
constructive trust could not be imposed); Nani v. Vanasse, No. C.A. PC/05-
955, 2003 WL 24274579, at *7–10, *12 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003) (finding 
confidential relationship existed between an unmarried couple, determining 
the defendant breached the relationship, and imposing a constructive trust in 
favor of the plaintiff on a house that was jointly purchased but on which the 
defendant alone had legal title).  
 71.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
49–53 (2011). 
 72.  See id. § 49(2). 
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a known risk that the conduct would violate the rights of the 
claimant; in such a situation, the defendant is liable for the 
amount transferred from the claimant to the defendant and for 
any net profit attributable to the underlying wrong.73 (For 
example, the defendant who misappropriates claimant’s money 
and successfully invests it for a net profit must disgorge the gain 
to the claimant.)74  Rhode Island law has long recognized the rule 
that a conscious wrongdoer or defaulting fiduciary must disgorge 
the net gain from money wrongfully obtained from the claimant.75 
If a defendant has been unjustly enriched by a nonreturnable 
benefit, the measure of a money judgment in restitution generally 
will vary according to the blameworthiness of the defendant in 
obtaining the benefit; extensive rules are set forth in the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.76  If 
the defendant was an innocent recipient of the benefit (e.g., the 
claimant mistakenly conferred a benefit on the defendant), the 
defendant generally must give back only the monetary value of 
the benefit, conservatively measured.77  If the defendant was 
responsible for its own enrichment but not a “conscious 
wrongdoer” (e.g., the defendant was negligent or unreasonably 
failed, despite notice and opportunity, to avoid or rectify the 
unjust enrichment), the defendant may be subject to greater 
 
 73.  See id. § 51(4).  The Restatement elaborates how to determine “net 
profit.”  Id.  § 51(5) & cmts. e–j. 
 74.  See id. §§ 49(4), 51 & illus. 10, 12.   
 75.  See, e.g., Greene v. Haskell, 5 R.I. 447, 456–57 (R.I. 1858).  In 
Greene, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the defendant had 
wrongfully taken the plaintiffs’ money to pay partially for African ivory.  Id. 
at 454.  The ivory was to be sold.  Id.  The court stated that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to either their proportion of the proceeds of the sale of the ivory 
or the return of their money that was used to purchase the ivory.  Id. at 456–
57.  This case illustrates the rule that a conscious wrongdoer should disgorge 
any gain resulting from the wrongful retention of a benefit at the plaintiff’s 
expense.  However, the court required that the plaintiffs make this election 
before the sale.  Id.  The Restatement criticizes the court’s decision to make 
the plaintiffs choose their remedy prior to the sale as “inconsistent with the 
principle that the conscious wrongdoer be denied any chance of profit from 
the use of another’s property.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56, reporter’s note h (emphasis added). 
 76.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
49(3), 50–52. 
 77.  See id. § 50 (stating rules for measuring the value of nonreturnable 
benefits acquired by an innocent recipient, varying on whether the benefit 
was requested or not requested by the innocent recipient of the benefit).   
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liability in restitution than an innocent recipient of the same 
benefit; the measure of the defendant’s enrichment may be chosen 
so as to avoid or mitigate loss to the claimant.78  With respect to a 
“conscious wrongdoer” or a defaulting fiduciary, the remedial rule 
is the same for nonreturnable benefits as it is for a monetary 
transfer from the claimant to the defendant—the defendant must 
disgorge net gains to the claimant.79 
Beyond the remedial rules that a “conscious wrongdoer” or 
defaulting fiduciary must disgorge to the claimant any net gain 
the defendant made, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment also recognizes that for certain breaches of 
contract (which it labels “opportunistic” breaches), the breaching 
party may be liable to disgorge its net gain from the breach.80  
Relying on abundant case law in several jurisdictions, the 
Restatement (Third) states that a claimant should be able to 
recover the defendant’s net profits resulting from the defendant’s 
breach if the breach was deliberate and contract damages for the 
claimant’s loss would afford “inadequate protection to the 
promisee’s contractual entitlement.”81  The latter condition is 
satisfied if a court with the benefit of hindsight would have 
granted an injunction or specific performance because contract 
damages would not have been adequate to protect the claimant’s 
rights under the contract.82 
An example of disgorgement of profits for “opportunistic” 
breach of contract in the Restatement (Third) involves a contract 
for the sale of real estate providing that existing timber and gravel 
are to be conveyed with the property.83  The seller of the real 
estate breaches the contract by removing the timber and gravel, 
which the seller sells at a profit of $10,000.  The purchaser later 
 
 78.  See id. § 52.   
 79.  See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(assuming that Rhode Island would adopt a disgorgement-of-profits rule to 
“avoid[ ] unjust enrichment for redemption of minority shareholders’ stock 
involving a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate officers who are majority 
shareholders in close corporations”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51. 
 80.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
39. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at § 39 cmt. c. 
 83.  See id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 2.   
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takes title to the real estate.  The removal of timber and gravel 
does not diminish the market value of the real estate; contract 
damages for the purchaser’s loss accordingly would be minimal.  A 
contract damages remedy for such a breach would afford 
“inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement” 
to obtain the real estate with the timber and gravel still attached.  
Thus, the purchaser is entitled to recover seller’s $10,000 profit.84 
The foregoing illustration in the Restatement (Third) is based 
on a Massachusetts case.85  I have not found a reported Rhode 
Island case that directly addresses whether disgorgement of 
defendant’s profits is an appropriate remedy for breach of 
contract.  However, on the strength of the Restatement (Third) 
and case law in other jurisdictions, one could argue that Rhode 
Island law should recognize the availability of disgorgement of 
profits when the defendant’s breach of contract is both profitable 
to the defendant and contract damages would afford inadequate 
protection to the claimant’s contractual rights. 
B.   Restitution Through an Asset-Based Remedy 
The law of restitution affords very powerful asset-based 
remedies.  These remedies are advantageous when the claimant 
wants its particular asset back, when claimant’s asset (or its 
traceable product) has increased in value, or when the defendant 
is insolvent.  Asset-based restitutionary remedies at law include 
replevin, which is the return of personal property to which the 
claimant retains legal title (such as when the property has been 
stolen).  Asset-based restitutionary remedies in equity include the 
constructive trust and equitable lien, which grant the claimant a 
property interest in a specific asset to which the defendant has 
obtained legal title but in which the claimant has an “equitable” 
interest.  For example, a claimant would have an equitable 
interest in an asset that the defendant obtained because of the 
claimant’s mistake or the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.  
Moreover, restitution through an asset-based remedy allows the 
 
 84.  See id.  
 85.  Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678–79 (Mass. 
1977) (noting that defendant’s breach was “deliberate and willful” and a 
disgorgement remedy on the facts was not punitive—disgorgement “merely 
deprives the defendant of a profit wrongfully made, a profit which the 
plaintiff was entitled to make”). 
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claimant to trace its property or funds through subsequent 
transfers or changes in form. 
1.   Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien Defined 
The constructive trust is a remedy that requires the 
defendant to convey specific property or funds to the claimant.86  
It is based on the fiction that the defendant is holding the 
property or funds as “trustee” for the claimant, with the claimant 
being the “equitable” owner of the property or funds.87  The 
equitable lien is a remedy that secures a money judgment against 
the defendant with a specific asset in which the claimant is 
deemed the “equitable” lienholder.88  The Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment states that a claimant need 
not demonstrate the inadequacy of legal remedies in order to 
obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien; I found no Rhode 
Island case law to the contrary.89 
Generally, a claimant should prefer a constructive trust if the 
claimant’s asset or its traceable product has increased value.  A 
claimant should prefer an equitable lien if the value of the 
 
 86.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
55. 
 87.  See id.  A constructive trust should not be confused with a resulting 
trust.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has explained the 
distinction:  
Unlike resulting trusts, which are used primarily to enforce the 
parties’ unstated plan at the time of the transfer [of an asset], 
constructive trusts are used as remedial devices regardless of the 
parties’ original intent “whenever title to property is found in one 
who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it.” 
In re Valente, 360 F.3d 256, 262–63 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting GEORGE 
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 262 (1973)).   
 88.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
56. 
 89.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(2).  
To determine whether Rhode Island law requires that a claimant seeking a 
constructive trust or equitable lien must establish the inadequacy of legal 
remedies, I conducted research on February 3, 2015 in the LexisNexis online 
database, “RI Federal and State Cases, Combined.”  For the first search, I 
used the terms “constructive pre/1 trust” w/50 “inadeq! w/8 remed!”; for the 
second search, I used the terms “equitable pre/1lien” w/50 “inadeq! w/8 
remed!”  Neither search revealed Rhode Island case law requiring a claimant 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of legal remedies in order to obtain a 
constructive trust or equitable lien.  
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identifiable property is less than the amount of the defendant’s 
liability because the claimant will be entitled to a money 
judgment for the full liability amount.  That judgment amount is 
secured by an equitable lien on the property, and the deficiency 
can be pursued by other collection means.90 
2.   Requirements for Imposition of the Constructive Trust or 
Equitable Lien 
Under Rhode Island law, the person seeking imposition of a 
constructive trust or equitable lien must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the remedy is warranted.91 
To obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien, the restitution 
claimant must show that the “defendant is unjustly enriched by 
the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of 
the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.”92  In other 
words, the claimant must both establish a claim under the 
substantive law of unjust enrichment and identify specific 
property in which the claimant has an “equitable” interest.  In 
terms of substantive law, Rhode Island courts thus far have 
recognized the possibility of a constructive trust or equitable lien 
when an asset has been acquired through violation of a fiduciary 
or confidential relationship,93 undue influence,94 fraud,95 
 
 90.  See, e.g., Darr v. Muratore, 143 B.R. 973, 976 (D.R.I. 1992) (“Where a 
defendant has used the funds of a plaintiff to purchase new property, the 
plaintiff may have the option of enforcing either a constructive trust of the 
property or an equitable lien against the property.”). 
 91.  See, e.g., Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1013 (R.I. 2007). 
 92.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1). 
 93.  See, e.g., Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111–12 (R.I. 2005) 
(stating that imposition of a constructive trust requires existence of a 
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties and either a breach 
of a fiduciary duty or fraud resulting from the parties’ association; former 
daughter-in-law not entitled to constructive trust over house owned by in-
laws and in which she resided because facts did not establish a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship); Sladen v. Rowse, 347 A.2d 409, 412–13 (R.I. 1975) 
(imposing a constructive trust on stock in favor of claimant company because 
defendant, who was a director and officer of the company, breached his 
fiduciary obligations by diverting the opportunity to buy the stock at a low 
price to himself); Nani v. Vanasse, C.A. No. PC/05-995, 2003 WL 24274579, at 
*7–11 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2006) (finding a confidential relationship 
existed between an unmarried couple, defendant breached the relationship, 
and imposing a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff on a house that was 
jointly purchased but to which the defendant alone had legal title).  Under 
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misappropriation,96 or testamentary devise or intestate succession 
in exchange for a promise to hold in trust.97  The Restatement 
(Third) also recognizes mistaken transfer of an asset as 
supporting the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable 
lien.98 
Once a claim under the substantive law of unjust enrichment 
is established, the claimant also must show that it has an 
equitable interest in a specific asset to which the initial recipient 
or a third person has legal title.99  This showing can be made 
directly—when the very asset obtained from the claimant is held 
by the initial recipient or a third person—or by tracing the 
claimant’s asset through subsequent changes in form.100 
3.  Advantages of an Asset-Based Equitable Remedy Compared to 
a Simple Money Judgment 
An asset-based equitable remedy may be more advantageous 
to the claimant than a simple money judgment in a variety of 
circumstances, which are listed and exemplified below. 
 
Rhode Island law, if a fiduciary or confidential relationship is proven, the 
plaintiff must also prove “either a breach of a promise or an act involving 
fraud occurred as a result of the relationship.”  Manchester, 926 A.2d at 1013.  
 94. See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, No. 03–CV–219–S, 2005 WL 5438379, at 
*1 (D.R.I. Feb. 18, 2005) (stating that undue influence is a “set of 
circumstances which gives rise to an equitable remedy, such as . . . imposition 
of a constructive trust”). 
 95. See, e.g., J.K. Social Club v. J.K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 (R. 
I. 1982) (“For fraud to lead to the creation of a constructive trust, the 
evidence must show that the holder of legal title procured title through fraud.  
There must be an actual misrepresentation of present intent.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Slater v. Oriental Mills, 27 A. 443, 443–44 (R.I. 1893) 
(authorizing a constructive trust in situation of misappropriation).  
 97.  See, e.g., Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985). 
 98.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 
cmt. f (2011) (“The underlying transaction is ordinarily one that is subject to 
avoidance for fraud, mistake, or comparable grounds of invalidity, or one in 
which the defendant has acquired property by wrongful interference with the 
claimant’s legally protected interests.”). 
 99.  See id. §§ 55, 56. 
 100.  See, e.g., Slater, 27 A. at 443  (“The rule is clear that one has an 
equitable right to follow and reclaim his property, which has been wrongfully 
appropriated by another, so long as he can find the property, or its 
substantial equivalent if its form has been changed, upon the ground that 
such property, in whatever form, is impressed with a trust in favor of the 
owner.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 58. 
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a.  The constructive trust is advantageous when the asset in which 
the claimant has an equitable interest has increased in 
value.101 
Example: Through undue influence, Defendant 
obtained stock worth $1,000 from Claimant.  The 
stock is now worth $2,000.  Claimant should seek a 
constructive trust over the stock rather than a money 
judgment for $1,000 (the value of the stock when 
initially obtained from Claimant). 
b.  The constructive trust or equitable lien enables a claimant to 
trace its asset through subsequent changes in form.102 
Example: Through fraud, Defendant obtained stock 
from Claimant worth $1,000.  Defendant sold the 
stock and reinvested the full $1,000 to purchase a 
work of art for $1,000.  The art is now worth $2,000.  
Claimant may obtain the work of art via a 
constructive trust. 
 
 101.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 
7, topic 2, intro. note (“Where assets have increased in value, restitution from 
property may give the claimant the benefit of the appreciation without the 
need to prove the amount of the defendant’s enrichment.”); id. at §55 cmt. i. 
 102. See, e.g., Slater, 27 A. at 443 (“The rule is clear that one has an 
equitable right to follow and reclaim his property, which has been wrongfully 
appropriated by another, so long as he can find the property, or its 
substantial equivalent if its form has been changed, upon the ground that 
such property, in whatever form, is impressed with a trust in favor of the 
owner.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 58. 
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c.   If the claimant’s asset has been commingled with the 
defendant’s asset in a common account, the claimant may, by 
tracing rules, identify its asset in the account and, in some 
circumstances, take advantage of any withdrawals that are 
invested profitably.103 
Example: Acting without authorization, Recipient 
deposits $1,000 of Claimant’s funds in a bank 
account that already contains $1,000 of Recipient’s 
funds.  Recipient makes a $1,500 withdrawal, using 
$1,000 for current expenditures and $500 to purchase 
shares of XYZ Corp.  The traceable product of 
Claimant’s original $1,000 may now be identified in 
the $500 balance in the bank account plus the XYZ 
shares.  Recipient holds the $500 in constructive 
trust for Claimant.  Restitution from the XYZ shares 
will be effected by a constructive trust or equitable 
lien, at Claimant’s election, depending on whether 
the shares have appreciated or declined in value.  If 
the XYZ shares are now worth $600, Claimant is 
entitled to the gain by a constructive trust over the 
shares.  If the XYZ shares are now worth $400, 
Claimant is entitled to a judgment of $500, secured 
by an equitable lien on the shares.  Claimant is 
entitled to the shares worth $400 and retains an 
unsecured claim for $100.104 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Hungerford v. Curtis, 110 A. 650, 652 (R.I. 1920) (“The fact 
that complainant’s money was intermingled with [defendant’s] did not 
destroy complainant’s equitable title and his right to follow and reclaim it.”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 58–
59 (discussing tracing of property into its product and into or through a 
commingled fund).  
 104.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 
cmt. d, illus. 5. 
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d.   The constructive trust or equitable lien enables the claimant to 
trace its asset into the hands of a third person who is not a 
bona fide purchaser or a bona fide payee and to obtain that 
asset from the third person.105 
Example: Through duress, Defendant obtains $1,000 
from Claimant, buys a used car with the $1,000, and 
transfers title of the car to a third person.  Claimant 
is entitled to a constructive trust over the car held by 
the third person even if the third person committed 
no wrong.  However, the third person may have a 
defense against the restitution claim if she was a 
bona fide purchaser of the car.106 
e.   The constructive trust or equitable lien is advantageous to the 
claimant if the recipient is insolvent, because the claimant’s 
property interest in the asset is not considered part of the 
recipient’s bankruptcy estate.107 
Example: If Claimant can trace its asset into the 
bank account of an insolvent debtor, the funds are 
imposed with a constructive trust for the benefit of 
Claimant.  Other creditors have no claim to those 
funds. 
Limitation: If the insolvent debtor in the above 
example has unpaid creditors or innocent 
dependents, Claimant can only recover its actual 
losses.  That is, Claimant is not entitled to recover 
any gains that the insolvent debtor may have 
 
 105.  See id. § 58(2) (“A claimant entitled to restitution from property or 
its traceable product may assert the same rights against any subsequent 
transferee who is not a bona fide purchaser . . . or a bona fide payee.”).  For 
discussion of the bona fide purchaser or payee defense, see below Part IV. 
 106.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 (2). 
 107. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 
618 (1st Cir. 1988) (“When a debtor is in possession of property impressed by 
a trust–express or constructive–the bankrupt estate holds the property 
subject to the outstanding interest of the beneficiaries. . . . [T]he claimant 
must identify the trust fund or property and, where the trust fund has been 
commingled with general property of the bankrupt, sufficiently trace the 
property or funds–the res.”).  
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obtained from Claimant’s asset.108 
C.   Implications for Discovery 
Because of the distinctive advantages of restitutionary 
remedies, it may be prudent during discovery to seek information 
about potential gains the defendant made as a result of its 
dealings with the plaintiff, and, if the defendant obtained an asset 
from the plaintiff, any actions the defendant took with respect to 
the asset.  For example, did the defendant transfer the claimant’s 
money or property to someone else?  Did the defendant purchase a 
different asset with the plaintiff’s money or property?  Did the 
defendant put the claimant’s money in a banking or investment 
account or otherwise invest the money? 
There are three independent reasons for seeking to trace the 
claimant’s asset.  First, if the defendant was a “conscious” 
wrongdoer or one who violated a fiduciary or confidential duty, 
any gain that the defendant made with the asset can be recovered 
by the claimant via restitution, even if that gain is greater than 
the claimant’s loss.109  (Of course, if the defendant’s gain is less 
than the claimant’s loss, then the claimant will instead pursue 
compensatory damages for the loss resulting from the wrong.)  
Second, the claimant may be entitled to a constructive trust or 
equitable lien on the traceable product of its asset.110  Third, if the 
defendant becomes insolvent, a restitution claimant’s success in 
tracing its money or property into an asset held by the defendant 
will give the claimant a property interest in the asset, and the 
asset will not be considered part of any eventual bankruptcy 
estate.111 
In a breach of contract case, the plaintiff may want to inquire 
during discovery whether the breaching party made a profit from 
the breach.  If the breaching party did profit from the breach, the 
claimant may be entitled to the breaching party’s profits, 
providing the breach meets the elements of an “opportunistic” 
breach discussed earlier.112 
 
 108.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 61. 
 109.  See supra Part II.D & Part III.A. 
 110.  See supra Part III.B. 
 111.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 112.  See supra Part III.A. 
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IV.   DEFENSES TO THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
In addition to defenses that apply generally in civil 
litigation,113 a defendant to an unjust enrichment claim may be 
able to invoke defenses that are unique to the law of 
restitution.114  One example is detrimental change of position—an 
innocent recipient of a benefit (usually in the circumstance of a 
mistaken payment) has a defense to the restitution claim if the 
recipient justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistaken 
benefit.115  The defendant may not escape making restitution to 
the claimant, however, if the defendant’s only reliance was paying 
living expenses or preexisting debts.116  Another example is the 
bona fide purchaser defense—a claimant may not obtain 
restitution of property from a third person if the third person was 
a bona fide purchaser for value of the property.117  Parallel to the 
 
 113.  In the absence of a specific statutory limitations period applicable to 
a particular claim, it appears that unjust enrichment claims fall within the 
general limitations period of ten years under Rhode Island General Laws 
section 9-1-13.  See, e.g., Jonklaas v. Silverman, 370 A.2d 1277, 1280 (R.I. 
1977) (applying Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-13 to a claim of 
mistaken payment of money). 
 114.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 62–70 (2011). 
 115.  See id. § 65.  A claim to restitution based on mistake may be defeated 
if the defendant justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistaken benefit.  
See, e.g., Romano v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of R.I., 767 A.2d 35, 45 
(R.I. 2001) (recognizing change of position as a defense to claim of restitution 
to recover money paid by mistake; burden is on recipient of mistaken 
payment to prove change of position (citing Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at 1281–82)).   
 116.  See, e.g., Romano, 767 A.2d at 45 (quoting Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at 
1282); see also Goodbody & Co., Inc., v. Parente, 358 A.2d 32, 34–35 (R.I. 
1976) (holding that where claimant had mistakenly transferred shares and 
dividends to recipient, recipient’s bad-faith delay in making restitution 
precluded any defense based on change of position). 
 117.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 66, 68, 69 (discussing, respectively, the bona fide purchaser 
defense, the concept of “for value,” and the requirement that the recipient of 
the benefit must have acted “without notice” of the facts giving rise to the 
restitution claim).  An example of the bona fide purchaser defense applied in 
Rhode Island is Fleckhamer v. Fleckhamer, 147 A. 886, 887–88 (R.I. 1929), in 
which a son wrongfully took money from a bank account held jointly by him 
and his mother, purchased two parcels of real estate with the money, and 
named his wife as joint tenant.  Id. at 887.  Upon the son’s death, the wife 
conveyed both parcels to Landin, the person with whom she was living.  Id.  
Landin sold one parcel to Doyle and granted a mortgage in the other parcel to 
Doyle as security for Doyle’s loan to Landin.  Id.  The Rhode Island Supreme 
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bona fide purchaser defense is the bona fide payee defense.  This 
defense may arise when a recipient obtains money that is not its 
own, whether by mistake or misappropriation, and uses that 
money to pay its creditor.  The creditor, if it did not have notice of 
the mistake or misappropriation, is considered a bona fide payee 
with a defense to any restitution claim.118  This is true even if the 
money is still identifiable as the asset of the restitution claimant 
and even if the bona fide payee had not detrimentally relied on the 
payment.119 
CONCLUSION 
This overview of restitutionary causes of action and remedies 
has been intended to serve as a starting point for recognizing 
when a cause of action in unjust enrichment may exist and when 
restitutionary remedies may be of particular benefit to a claimant.  
Practitioners with potential unjust enrichment claims are 
encouraged to consult not only the Rhode Island cases referenced 
in the footnotes, but also the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment for a deep and comprehensive treatment 
of the substantive and remedial law and for very helpful 
illustrations and case citations. 
 
 
Court determined that the mother was entitled to restitution from the wife 
and Landin because they were not bona fide purchasers for value.  Id. at 888.  
The court also ruled that the mother was not entitled to restitution from 
Doyle because his rights in the real estate were acquired by bona fide 
purchases for value, without notice of the facts giving rise to the restitution 
claim.  Id. at 888.  
 118.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
67, 68, 69 (discussing, respectively, the bona fide payee defense, the concept 
of “for value,” and the requirement that the recipient of the benefit must have 
acted “without notice” of the facts giving rise to the restitution claim). 
 119.  See id. 
